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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey will review major criminal cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Florida and Florida District Courts of Appeal that cover substantive
criminal issues published between the time period of July, 2004 through July,
2007. The time period begins where the last Criminal Law Review Survey
created for this Law Review ended.' It will discuss cases that interpret the
provisions of statutes, as well as defenses, which deal with elements that
constitute the definitions of the same. It will focus on cases that address pro-
visions or issues for the first time, clarify areas that have created confusion,
or change existing understandings. Therefore, this article will follow the
conventions followed in selecting cases for discussion utilized in prior Crim-
inal Law Survey articles.2
1. William E. Adams, Jr., Criminal Law: 2002-2004 Survey of Florida Law, 29 NOVA
L. REV. 1 (2004).
2. As in past criminal law surveys, this article will not address criminal procedure issues
such as search and seizure. Although significant to the practitioner, those issues raise consti-
tutional concerns that extend beyond the substantive focus of this piece. Furthermore, consis-
tent with past articles, this survey will not generally address the complex and specialized areas
of death penalty convictions and the proper application of sentencing guidelines.
1
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II. ASSAULT AND BATTERY
In Miller v. State,3 the Second District Court of Appeal decided an ap-
peal that reviewed the fear element in an aggravated assault case.4 In this
case, Ms. Miller was dismissed "from her job at a bank," and when she "at-
tempted to collect her final paycheck," was escorted from the bank by its
security officer, Trace Barnes.5 Miller became upset and "made an audible
threat" as she got into her car. 6 "She then drove her car" at Barnes and "an-
other bank employee, Katherine Zevetchin."7 "Zevetchin testified that she
was frightened," but at least some evidence indicated that Barnes was not. 8
The appellate court reversed the conviction because the trial court's instruc-
tion permitted the jury to find Miller guilty if either victim had a well-
founded fear that violence was about to take place. 9 As the appellate court
correctly noted, section 784.011 of the Florida Statutes "requires that [a]
person who is threatened ... fear that [the] violence is imminent."'
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed what constitutes a deadly
weapon, in aggravated battery convictions, in Zapata v. State." Zapata bat-
tered his ex-girlfriend by beating her "head against a cement pillar wall and
then ... against a car."' 2 He was "convicted of aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon, the wall, and battery as a lesser included offense of [the
charged] aggravated battery [with a deadly weapon], the car."' 3 The court
reversed the aggravated battery charge holding that a wall cannot be consid-
ered a weapon and, therefore, reduced that conviction to a battery.' 4 It also
directed the trial court to vacate one of the battery convictions because "the
two convictions [arose] from the same continuous criminal act or episode."' 5
Whether stationary objects such as walls or floors are considered weapons,
especially when the defendant beats a part of the victim's body against it, has
caused interpretational problems for courts; but this decision is consistent
with that of other jurisdictions.
3. 918 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
4. Id. at 415-16.
5. Id. at 416.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Miller, 918 So. 2d at 416.
9. Id. at 416-17.
10. Id. at417.
11. 905 So. 2d 944, 944-45 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
12. Id. at 945.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing State v. Houck, 652 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1995)).
15. Id. (citing Olivard v. State, 831 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
[Vol. 32
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In Munoz-Perez v. State,16 the Fourth District Court of Appeal also in-
terpreted an element of aggravated battery-this time what constituted "use[]
[of] a deadly weapon."' 7 The defendant argued that his conviction should be
overturned because "he never touched the victim with the knife,"' 8 rather "he
.. held it near her throat" during the burglary.' 9 The court agreed, deciding
that the Florida Statutes' reference to "uses [of] a deadly weapon"2 requires
that the weapon commit the touching in order to constitute a battery.2'
In Jones v. State,2 the Fourth District considered another battery case,
but this time the issue was what constitutes a deadly weapon.2 3 Jones was
"convicted of sexual battery with a deadly weapon., 2 4 Jones entered "the
apartment of the victim" by displaying a stun gun and pulling the trigger.25
"[T]he device . . . emitted a blue light and a buzzing sound., 26 The court
reversed the conviction because it deemed "that [a] stun gun was [not] a




The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a felony murder conviction pur-
suant to the merger doctrine in Brooks v. State.28 This case involved the
stabbing to death of a woman and her daughter, by Brooks.29  Although
Brooks' murder convictions and death sentence were upheld on other
grounds, the Court, in a per curiam opinion, found that it was erroneous to
use the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse as the predicate felony
crime in a first-degree felony murder charge. 30 The Court relied on its prior
decision in Mills v. State3' in finding that, because the child was killed by a
single stab, the felonious conduct that constituted the child abuse was the
16. 942 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
17. Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 1027.
19. Id. at 1026.
20. FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(a)2 (2007).
21. Munoz-Perez, 942 So. 2d at 1028.
22. 885 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
23. Id. at 467.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 467-68.
27. Jones, 885 So. 2d at 468.
28. 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam).
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id. at 199.
31. 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985).
3
Adams: Criminal Law: 2004-2007 Review of Florida Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LAW REVIEW
same that caused the death and, thus, the felony merged into the homicide. 32
The Court distinguished the case of Mapps v. State,33 in which the defen-
dant's felony murder conviction was upheld where "the underlying felony
[was] aggravated child abuse,, 34 but "there were separate acts of striking,
shaking, or throwing" the child. 35 Justice Lewis, dissenting in part and con-
curring in part, argued that Mills is inapposite because Brooks was not sepa-
rately charged and convicted of felony child abuse, 36 and because the felony
murder statute had been amended since Mills to "include 'aggravated child
abuse' [amongst] the felonies that would invoke ... felony murder., 37 As a
result, it could be a predicate felony for felony murder .3' Although the stat-
ute does indicate that the crime of child abuse is a predicate felony,39 the
majority opinion is defensible and consistent with what some courts would
deem an appropriate application of the merger doctrine.
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the intent requirements
concerning a homicide inflicted by a single blow to the head in Hall v.
State.40 The victim in the case "threw a large rock toward the deck of [a
restaurant, which] struck an innocent bystander in the back, causing her to
fall to the ground."41 Hall, who did not know the victim or the bystander,
happened upon the scene.42 After asking the bystander and other witnesses
who threw the rock, he began to chase the victim.43 The defendant struck the
victim with a single blow to the jaw." Unfortunately for both the victim and
the defendant, this single punch caused a fatal brain hemorrhage. 45 Expert
testimony indicated that this outcome was "a very unusual occurrence" as a
result of a single punch because of its placement.46 In addressing this trag-
edy, the court first rejected the defendant's argument that it was an excusable
32. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198.
33. 520 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
34. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198.
35. Id. (citing Mapps, 520 So. 2d at 93).
36. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 218 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 219. Compare FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1979), with FLA. STAT. §
782.04(1)(a)2h (Supp. 1984) (indicating that "aggravated child abuse" constitutes felony mur-
der "[w]hen committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpe-
trate").
38. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 218; see also FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2h (Supp. 1984).
39. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2h (2002).




44. Id. at 93.
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homicide "in the heat of passion ... [or] sudden combat., 4 7 The court noted
that these arguments had "been rejected in [other] single-punch-to-the-head
cases."48 Further, this case involved a situation in which the victim did not
demonstrate aggression towards the defendant, who "chased [the victim]
down and dodged intervention attempts by" a security guard and deputy
sheriff.49 Furthermore, the fatal blow was landed while the victim was oth-
erwise distracted." The court also rejected defendant's argument that he
could not be convicted of manslaughter by an act where he lacked the intent
to kill.51 The defendant argued that because homicide is considered a result
crime, the defendant needed to intend the result-the death of the victim. 2
The court held that the intent to commit the act that caused the death was
sufficient.53 Although the intent to kill is not required for manslaughter, it is
usually required that the defendant's state of mind concerning the death is an
element.54 However, it could easily be argued here that the defendant had
the required state of mind with regard to the death, for this crime.5
The Second District Court of Appeal also considered an appeal of a sin-
gle-punch manslaughter conviction in Acosta v. State.56 This case involved
two teens who got into an argument and decided to meet after school to settle
their disagreement with a fight."7 A number of friends accompanied them,
and while the victim argued with one of the other students, Acosta punched
him in the face at the moment the victim was distracted and "unprepared to
defend himself."58 Similar to the case discussed above, the medical exam-
iner determined that the victim died from a rare, but well documented, verte-
bral artery hemorrhage caused by a single blow."9 The court noted the trag-
edy of committing this young man to prison. 0 However, it did not accept
the defendant's argument that he could not be found guilty of manslaughter
in the case of a brief disagreement where the death was not caused by a dan-
47. Id. at 94 (citing Acosta v. State, 884 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 95.
50. Hall, 951 So. 2d at 93.
51. Id. at 95.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 96.
54. Id. at 95-96.
55. See Hall, 951 So. 2d at 96.
56. 884 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 114.
60. Id. at 115.
5
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gerous weapon or involve an act done in a cruel or unusual manner.6 The
court also rejected the claim that it was the result of sudden combat.62
The Third District Court of Appeal overturned a "motion to dismiss the
... prosecution of a vehicular homicide charge" in State v. Gensler.6 3 Gens-
ler was a police officer, who proceeded through an intersection with a flash-
ing yellow light, on her way to a call. 64 She was traveling at "approximately
ninety miles per hour" in an area "where the posted speed limit was forty-
five miles per hour. '65 She struck the victim who was crossing the road "just
north of the crosswalk., 66 "At the time of the collision, the victim had alco-
hol and cocaine in her body., 67 The defendant argued that she was not the
proximate cause of the death. 68 The appellate court held that it was not ap-
propriate to remove this case from the jury where the facts presented an issue
of whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of the risk of the
danger created by defendant's speed while going through an intersection, in a
business district, at three o'clock in the morning.69 In the dissent, Judge
Schwartz argued that insufficient facts were presented to demonstrate that
the defendant was the legal "but for" cause of the death. 70
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a conviction for solicita-
tion to commit second degree murder in Jones v. State.71 While incarcerated,
Jones reportedly told another inmate that he wanted someone to make sure
that David Hunt did not show up in a courtroom, or otherwise make sure he
did not testify against Jones.72 However, "Jones did not actually use the
word 'kill"' in this exchange. 73 The inmate reported this conversation to law
enforcement. 7' A sting operation was initiated in which a meeting with
Jones was set up with an undercover detective.75 During the meeting with
the detective, Jones made some statements that could be interpreted as him
wanting Hunt killed, and others that indicated "that he wanted Hunt beaten
61. Acosta, 884 So. 2d at 114.
62. Id. at 115.





68. Gensler, 929 So. 2d at 30.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 32 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
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so bad[ly]" that he needed a wheelchair.7 6 Under the facts of the case, the
court held that the jury could find that he either committed a "solicitation to
commit first degree murder or solicitation to commit aggravated battery. '
While the court would not go so far as to say "the crime of solicitation to
commit second degree murder.., does not exist, ' 78 it did acknowledge that
it could not envision a contract kilijng that was not premeditated, 79 and held
that it was not present in this case. It did indicate that some Florida cases
have stated that such a crime does exist,"' and it also noted that both conspir-
acy and "attempt to commit second degree murder are crimes" in Florida. 82
In Dorsey v. State,8 3 the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the de-
fendant could be found guilty of both aggravated child abuse and first degree
felony murder where the child abuse claim constituted the underlying fel-
ony. 84 It distinguished the case from Brooks, 5 discussed above. The Fifth
District noted that Brooks involved a single act of stabbing, unlike the case
before it where Dorsey shook the baby to death. 6 There was other evidence
to indicate that the abuse occurred over more than a single moment in time. 87
Like the Supreme Court of Florida, the District Court also noted that Flor-
ida's felony murder statute includes aggravated child abuse as one of the
enumerated felonies.88
IV. RESISTING ARREST
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Third District Court of Ap-
peal in a case involving a conviction for resisting arrest in Polite v. State. 9
In this case, an undercover officer in plain clothes attempted to arrest the
defendant who attempted to hit the officer and also fled the scene.9° The
defendant appealed the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury "that the
state must prove that [he] knew that [the undercover officer] was an offi-
76. Jones, 908 So. 2d at 618.
77. Id. at 620.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Miller v. State, 430 So. 2d 611, 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
80. Id.
81. Jones, 908 So. 2d at 620.
82. Id. at 620 n.l.
83. 942 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct, App. 2006).
84. Id. at 984, 986.
85. Id. at 986.
86. Id. at 984-85.
87. Id. at 985-86.
88. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2 (2007); Dorsey, 942 So. 2d at 984.
89. 32 Fla. L. Weekly S576, S576 (Sept. 27, 2007).
90. Id.
7
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cer."' The Third District had held that since the statute requires a person to
"knowingly and willfully resist[], obstruct[], or oppose[] any officer,"92 the
adverb "knowingly" only modified the verbs and not the noun "officer. 93
That court also stated that the resistance with violence statute was a general
intent offense and, therefore, the intent requirement only applied to commit-
ting the proscribed act.94 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected this inter-
pretation as being contrary to the statute's plain language, a potential viola-
tion of due process, and contrary to a proper construction when compared to
lesser included offenses.95
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the element of "lawful
execution of any legal duty" in Yarusso v. State.96 Yarusso was approached
by plain clothes officers in an auto dealership parking lot at three quarters
past ten in the evening, while the dealership was closed and in a "high-
burglary area." 97  The officers asked the defendant to produce identifica-
tion.98 The defendant proceeded to return to his truck.99 After entering his
truck, the defendant proceeded to lock the doors and drive away, hitting one
of the officer's hands with his rearview mirror. 100 The parties agreed that the
encounter was initially consensual.'l The court stated that a citizen has a
right to terminate a consensual encounter with law enforcement officers at
any time,"' and that Yarusso unequivocally expressed this intention when he
entered "his truck, locked the door, and started the ignition."' 3 Thus, the
officer was not "engaged in the lawful" exercise of duty when his hand was
hit. " The court also held that fleeing from the officers did not constitute
resistance because the officers lacked a sufficient basis for detaining him. '05
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the required elements for
Florida's lewd and lascivious acts statutes °6 in State v. Kees.107 Undercover
91. Id. at 589.
92. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 843.01 (2007)).
93. Id.
94. See Polite at 2790771.
95. Id. at 27907774-76.
96. 942 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).




101. Yarusso, 942 So. 2d at 942.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 943.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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officers went to the Red Horse Saloon and arrested the defendants after ob-
serving "women exposing their breasts and men kissing them, men inserting
their fingers into women's exposed vaginas, and a man lifting the skirt of a
woman and performing cunnilingus on her."' ° The county court held that
"an essential element of the crime[]" was that someone be offended. 19 The
appellate court disagreed, and distinguished the Supreme Court of Florida
case of Schmitt v. State,"° which stated that a lewd act required a lewd "act
of sexual indulgence or public indecency.""' The court argued that the latter
case required intentionality because the act occurred in a private place."'
V. KIDNAPPING
The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed an armed kidnapping
charge in Cole v. State.1"' Cole appealed his conviction for his actions at a
Dollar Store in which he pulled a handgun and ordered the cashier to 'get in
the bathroom [of the store] and to stay there."'"" The movement only re-
quired the victim to move a few feet and was confined for only a few min-
utes." 5 This occurred at the end of the robbery. 6 The court noted that
courts in Florida have held that "simply moving a robbery victim" to another
room, "even if [the] door is closed and the victim is ordered not to [leave], is
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain" a kidnapping conviction." 7 The
court determined that such confinement was "likely to naturally accompany
[the] robbery."'" 8 The court found that the evidence was sufficient to uphold
a false imprisonment conviction, however." 9
The Third District Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion in a
similar case, Frederick v. State. 20 Frederick broke into a McDonald's res-
taurant with two other men. 121 While the robbers proceeded to rob the safe,
two of the restaurant's employees were ordered into the freezer and "told to
107. 919 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
108. Id. at 504.
109. Id. at 506.
110. 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991).
111. Id. at410.
112. Kees, 919 So. 2d at 506.




117. Id. at 1012.
118. Cole, 942 So. 2d at 1013.
119. Id.
120. 931 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
121. Id. at 968-69.
9
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stay there."'122 After the robbers fled, the manager of the restaurant opened
the door and let them out. 123 Similar to the Second District, the court held
that this confinement was of the type that naturally accompanied the
crime. 124  Both cases correctly applied a test established by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Faison v. State. 
125
VI. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a criminal mischief con-
viction in Stinnett v. State. 126 The defendant shot his gun at another patron at
a bar that he had visited, but instead, hit a parked car. 127 The court held that
the defendant's intent to cause harm to a person could not be transferred to
satisfy the specific intent to harm property required for criminal mischief.'28
The Third District Court of Appeal, in MH. v. State,129 was asked to de-
termine if criminal mischief required specific intent, and found that it did
not. 130 The court reasoned that the statute does not use specific intent lan-
guage, which it apparently believed requires use of the word "intent." 
131
The Fifth District Court of Appeal also decided a case involving crimi-
nal mischief in Sanchez v. State.'32 Sanchez "attempted to purchase mer-
chandise with a credit card that did not belong to him." 133 When the clerk
refused to return the card, Sanchez tried to forcibly retrieve it.134 A struggle
ensued in which the defendant ended up biting the clerk. 135 Also, during the
122. Id. at 969.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 970.
125. 426 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1983) (citing State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 723 (1970)). In
Faison, the Supreme Court of Florida applied the following test to establish whether a con-
finement is deemed as kidnapping:
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of an-
other crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other
crime substantially easier of commission or lessens the risk of detection.)
Id.
126. 935 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
127. Id. at 633.
128. Id. at 634.
129. 936 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
130. Id. at 2.
131. See id. at 3.
132. 909 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
133. Id. at 982-83.
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struggle, "the clerk dropped the telephone, [which] broke."'' 36 Because Flor-
ida's criminal mischief statute requires an intent to damage or destroy the
property, 137 the court held that the malice directed towards the clerk could
not be transferred to the telephone. 38 The court also held that the defen-
dant's robbery conviction could be upheld, even though the force used by
Sanchez, the bite, occurred prior to the taking, because acts prior to the tak-
ing could be considered in the course of the taking, if the act and the taking
constituted a "continuous series of acts or events."' 39
VII. THEFT
The First District Court of Appeal addressed the requirements of Flor-
ida's "[r]obbery by sudden snatching" statute 40 in Nichols v. State."' The
court reversed the conviction of a thief who "grabbed a purse from a shop-
ping cart being pushed" by the victim where no force was used against her,
nor did any touching occur."'4 The court held that the crime requires that the
"taking [be] from the victim's person" as opposed to her custody."' There-
fore, it would not permit a conviction where the property was not taken from
the victim's "embrace."'" This is consistent with decisions from the Second
and Fourth District Courts. 145
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed an abandonment claim in
a grand theft conviction in Longval v. State.'46 Michelle Longval accompa-
nied her boyfriend, Anthony Hile, to Wal-Mart. 147 Hile testified that while
Longval was obtaining cigarettes from the cashier, he decided that he could
steal some items.148 Hile told Longval to take the shopping cart that he was
pushing and pick out a couple of items for herself, indicating that he would
purchase the items. "9 When he later asked her to "push the cart out of the
136. Id.
137. FLA. STAT. § 806.13 (2002).
138. Sanchez, 909 So. 2d at 985.
139. Id. at 984.
140. FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1) (2004).
141. 927 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
142. Id. at 90.
143. Id. at 91.
144. Id.
145. State v. Floyd, 872 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Brown v. State, 848
So. 2d 361, 363-64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
146. 914 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).




Adams: Criminal Law: 2004-2007 Review of Florida Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
store," she refused. 5 0 Instead, Hile pushed the cart out of the store.' 5' Hile
also "testified that he had no plan with Longval to distract the cashiers."' 52
"The trial court denied [Longval's] request" for an "instruction on the 'com-
mon law defense of abandonment."" 53
The appellate court then discussed the issue, which has arisen in Flor-
ida, of whether the defense of abandonment or renunciation, recognized in
Florida Statutes,'54 only applies to inchoate crimes. 155 It noted that the First
District Court of Appeal held that it did apply. 56 This court disagreed. 157 It
noted that the statute expanded the defense beyond the common law defense,
which did not apply if the defendant had proceeded far enough to be guilty of
attempt. '58 Then, it reasoned that Florida's grand theft statute includes "en-
deavors to obtain or... use,"'59 including within its scope acts that constitute
an attempt to commit grand theft. 160 By so defining the substantive crime,
Florida does not recognize attempted grand theft as a separate crime. 161
Therefore, the court concluded that abandonment as a defense applies to sub-
stantive crimes "that include attempts within their definition[s]."' 62 It also
noted that the language of the abandonment statute had been changed since
Dixon v. State,163 and the conclusion that abandonment could be raised as a
defense to theft was in accord with the reasoning of a theft case decided by
the Third District. 64
The Fifth District addressed the breadth of coverage of the state's theft
statute in Isenhour v. State. 165 Isenhour co-founded a private academy that
provided distance education to students who had been unsuccessful in public
school. 166 He also formed a nonprofit Scholarship Funding Organization
150. Id.
151. Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1100.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(5) (2004).
155. Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1101-02.
156. Id. (discussing Dixon v. State, 559 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
157. Id. at 1100.
158. Id. at 1101.
159. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1) (2004).
160. Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1101.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. 559 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990). The language of the abandonment
statute since Dixon has since been amended to broaden the scope of substantive crimes "that
include attempts within their definition." Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1101.
164. See Carroll v. State, 680 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
165. 952 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
166. Id. at 1217.
[Vol. 32
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(SFO) pursuant to Florida statutes that could seek corporate donations but
required 100 percent of the donations be given to "children in the form of
scholarships."' 67 He, unsuccessfully, attempted to get the academy to iden-
tify eligible students.168 The academy eventually experienced serious finan-
cial difficulties. 169 Eventually, Isenhour used funds for administrative costs,
which he knew was prohibited, but before he did so, he had telephoned both
the Department of Education and the Department of Revenue (DOR), seek-
ing advice as to what to do with the funds. 70 Because the statute was new,
he failed to receive helpful advice. 171 He also called the corporate donor
seeking to return the funds, but was rejected. 172 The court held that the de-
fendant lacked the intent to steal required by the statute. 73 Additionally, the
donor had relinquished its right to the funds. 174 The DOR had no right to the
funds during the dates alleged, and would not have been out any funds-tax
credits given to the corporate donor-had the scholarships been awarded. '75
Thus, the State failed to prove that the defendant possessed the required in-




The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal decided a Medicaid patient brokering and fraud case in State v. Rubio. 177
The defendant dentists had successfully argued to the Fifth District that the
anti-kickback portion of the Florida statute was unconstitutional. '78 At the
time of the alleged acts, this part of Florida's statute defined "knowingly" to
mean "a person who is aware or should be aware of the nature of his or her
conduct." 179 The controlling federal statute for Medicaid fraud required that
the person make or cause to be made false statements "knowingly and will-
167. Id. at 1217-18.
168. Id. at 1218.
169. Id.
170. Isenhour, 952 So. 2d at 1219.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1222.
174. Id.
175. Isenhour, 952 So. 2d at 1223.
176. Id. at 1223-24.
177. 2007 WL 2002586 (Fla. 2007).
178. 917 So. 2d 383, 387 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (referencing FLA. STAT. § 409.920
(2002)).
179. FLA. STAT. § 409.920(1)(d) (2002).
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fully."'8° The appellate court agreed that the statute violated the Supremacy
Clause by permitting conviction on a lesser intent requirement.,8' The Su-
preme Court argued that the statute could be salvaged by severing the
"should be aware" language from 409.920(l)(d) as it pertains to
409.920(2)(a). '82
The Third District also considered a Medicaid fraud case in State v.
Wolland.'83 Wolland, who was charged with 115 counts of filing false
claims, argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it was "pre-
empted by federal law." '184 This court addressed the difference between the
two statutes, noting that Florida required that the acts be done knowingly,
185
while the federal statute required knowingly and willfully. 186 It had also
previously held that this subsection was preempted. 187 It held that there was
no preemption in this case because the knowledge element implicitly in-
cluded willful behavior, and the court distinguished State v. Harden188 by
saying that the latter case dealt with a conflict in which the federal statute
had a safe harbor provision lacking in the Florida statute. 189 The Florida
statute has since been amended to indicate that the knowledge requirement
includes a willful state of mind.'90
IX. CONSPIRACY
The Third District Court of Appeal decided an appeal, in Campbell v.
State,191 involving a dispute concerning the requirements for "attempted traf-
ficking in cocaine."' 92 Campbell was caught in an undercover sting opera-
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (2000).
181. SeeRubio, 917So. 2dat392.
182. See Rubio, 2007 WL 2002591.
183. 902 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
184. Id. at 279-80.
185. Compare FLA. STAT. § 409.920(1)(d), with 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (indicating
that because the Florida statute omits the term "willfully" as a requirement, conduct that
would otherwise be lawful under the federal statute will be deemed unlawful under Florida
law).
186. Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 280.
187. State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
188. Id. at 352.
189. Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 286.
190. Compare FLA. STAT. § 409.920 (2003), with FLA. STAT. § 409.920 (2004) (indicating
a change in the knowingly requirement through the addition of "willfully" or "willful" in the
statute's definition of "knowingly").
191. 935 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
192. Id. at 615.
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tion designed to target persons involved "in drug-related 'rip-offs." 93 Be-
cause there was no cocaine actually involved in the sting operation, the de-
fendant argued that he could not be guilty of attempted trafficking. 94 The
court rejected this argument, despite the fact that trafficking would require
the existence of the drug, because attempt is satisfied if there is an intent to
commit a crime and an overt act taken towards commission-both of which
were clearly met in this case. 95
X. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The Second District Court of Appeal considered a Due Process chal-
lenge to amendments of the Florida statutes regarding possession of con-
trolled substances 9 6 in Wright v. State.'97 Following the Supreme Court of
Florida decisions in Scott v. State'98 and Chicone v. State,'99 the Florida leg-
islature found that the Court's holdings in those cases, which required "that
the state must prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of [the] con-
trolled substance ... [were] contrary to legislative intent., 200 Thus, the stat-
ute was amended to remove "knowledge of the illicit nature" as an element,
but to still permit the defendant to assert lack of knowledge as an affirmative
defense.2' However, if the defendant raises lack of knowledge as an af-
firmative defense, "a permissive presumption that the [defendant] knew of
the illicit nature" is raised.20 2 The court argued that the statute does not im-
properly shift the burden of proof of the knowledge element to the defendant
because the defendant is not required to disprove knowledge; instead, it
leaves it as an option to raise it as a defense.203 It also held that there was a
rational relationship between eliminating the element of knowledge because
of its difficulty to prove, 2°4 and because of the legitimate governmental inter-
est of addressing the drug problem.20 5
193. Id. at 615-16.
194. Id. at617.
195. Id. This is consistent with other rulings in Florida. E.g., Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d
879, 897 (Fla. 2000); State v. Cohen, 409 So. 2d 64, 64-65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
196. FLA. STAT. § 893.101 (2004).
197. 920 So. 2d 21, 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
198. 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002).
199. 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).
200. FLA. STAT. § 893.101; Wright, 920 So. 2d at 24.
201. FLA. STAT. § 893.101(2).
202. Id. § 893.101(3).




Adams: Criminal Law: 2004-2007 Review of Florida Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
The Second District Court of Appeal again considered Due Process and
First Amendment challenges to the Florida statute criminalizing receipt of
computer transmissions of information about a minor for purpose of sexual
conduct with a child2°6 in Wegner v. State.2 7 The defendant argued that the
statute is unconstitutional for failing to require that the offender know that
the person from whom the transmission is received is a minor. 20 ' By includ-
ing this element, the court also rejected the claimant's overbreadth argument,
which was based upon the lack of a mental element in the statute.20 9
XI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Czapla v. State,210 the First District Court of Appeal addressed the
defendant's claim that he raised a complete defense because he was adminis-
tering non-excessive corporal punishment in a child abuse case.21" ' In the
case, the defendant punched his son in the head and pushed him onto the
floor where he kicked him in the side. The defendant argued that the con-
viction could not be sustained because the state did not prove that his son had
sustained injuries more significant than bruises or welts. 2 3  The court re-
jected this argument, however, because intentionally kicking a child lying on
the ground is not reasonable corporal discipline as a matter of law.214
The First District also considered the definition of a convenience busi-
ness in a Florida statute in Baker v. State.215 Baker was "convicted of sale,
manufacture, delivery, or possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, manu-
facture or deliver cocaine within 1,000 feet of a convenience business.26
The relevant statute defines a convenience business to be one "that is open
for business at any time between the hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m.,, 217 The
store at issue in this case usually closed at ten o'clock in the evening, but
sometimes stayed open past eleven o'clock in the evening. 2I8 The court rec-
ognized that the statute was ambiguous and could be read to either include
206. FLA. STAT. § 847.0135(2)(d) (2000).
207. 928 So. 2d 436,437 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 440.
210. 957 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
211. Id. at 679.
212. Id. at 677.
213. Id. at 679.
214. Id. at 680.
215. 951 So. 2d 78, 78 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
216. Id.
217. FLA. STAT. § 812.171 (2005).
218. Baker, 951 So. 2d at 79.
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stores that are regularly open between the stated hours, or those that have at
some point opened between the listed times. 2 19 It held that the first reading
was more logical, and the appropriate interpretation under the Rule of Len-
ity.220
The Third District Court of Appeal decided two companion cases,
Cloyd v. State22" ' and Hughes v. State (Hughes IIJ),222 which attracted some
notoriety because they involved two intoxicated commercial airline pilots.
23
After a late night of drinking, the pilots got into a dispute with security per-
sonnel when they arrived at the airport for duty. 224 The personnel noticed the
odor of alcohol and reported the same to the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration (TSA) and the pilots' airline. 2 '5 The TSA notified the police,
who responded to the airport.226 By the time the police arrived, the pilots
were in the cockpit of the plane that they were to fly, "the jet way had been
pulled ... from the [airplane], and the [plane] was connected to the tug that
pushes it ... from the gate. 227 The police officers ordered the "tug driver to
return the [plane] to the gate., 2 ' The aviation expert testified that "the cap-
tain [was] in actual control of the aircraft" at that point in time and that the
plane could not be pushed back until the pilot so instructed.229 The driver of
the tug testified that the engines were not on, and that "the pilot [could not]
steer the aircraft" while "hooked up to the tug. ' 230 The State's expert testi-
fied that the pilots had activated and checked systems, and entered critical
data into the computer by this time.23'
After the trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss based
upon federal preemption,232 they petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, which was granted. 233 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court should have abstained be-
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 943 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
222. 943 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
223. Id. at 182; Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156.
224. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 182.
225. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 182-83.
226. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 183.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 157; Hughes I11, 943 So. 2d at 184.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 158; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 185.
233. Hughes v. Eleventh Jud. Cir. of Fla. (Hughes 1), 274 F.Supp. 2d 1334, 1335-36 (S.D.
Fla. 2003), rev'd, 377 F.3d 1258 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
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cause the preemption claim was not facially conclusive.234 The Third Dis-
trict rejected the preemption argument, 2" and also rejected arguments that
Florida's statute is vague, and that it unconstitutionally incorporated federal
standards. 236  Finally, the court found that the defendants could be found
guilty of operating the aircraft while intoxicated even though the engines had
not yet been started.237
Statutes outlawing loitering frequently cause courts and law enforce-
ment officers difficulties in application because of the indeterminacy of the
terms. Such statutes, in fact, frequently raise constitutional concerns. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal, sought to clarify the requirements for Flor-
ida's loitering statute in G.G. v. State.238 This case involved an officer ob-
serving juveniles at three forty-five in the morning behind a shopping plaza,
one of whom, not the defendant, was carrying a piece of brick.2'39 The juve-
niles claimed that "they were looking for their dog," and the defendant origi-
nally gave the officer a fictitious name.2 4' The defendant then advised her of
his real name, and was arrested for loitering and prowling. 241 Although the
court felt that the State had properly shown that the defendant was 'loitering
and prowling in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, ' ' '141 it did not
think that the facts supported a finding that a "breach of the peace [was] im-
minent or the public safety [was] threatened, ' 243 and therefore, reversed the
conviction.24
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the requirements for a
duress or necessity defense in Pflaum V'. State.2 45 Ryan Pflaum was con-
victed of perjury for "false statements [that he made] in a deposition and at a
subsequent trial., 246 Pflaum, Conrad Urbanowski, and others "were involved
in a fight with [Leonard] Albritton. ' ' 247 "Albritton was ... charged with ag-
gravated battery, and his defense was based upon presentation of' a video-
234. Hughes v. Att'y Gen. of Fla. (Hughes 11), 377 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1051 (2005).
235. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 158; Hughes III, 943 So. 2d at 185.
236. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 161, 164; Hughes 111, 943 So. 2d at 188, 190.
237. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 175; Hughes III, 943 So. 2d at 198-99.




242. Id. at 1033 (quoting Von Goff v. State, 687 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1997)).
243. G.G., 903 So. 2d at 1033.
244. Id. at 1034.
245. 879 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/2
2007] CRIMINAL LAW. 2004-2007 REVIEW OF FLORIDA LAW 19
tape of the fight.248 Pflaum falsely testified that the video did not exist and
that "Urbanowski did not have a reputation as a fighter or bully. 2 49 At his
perjury trial, Pflaum admitted that the statements were false, but that he
made them because of threats made by Urbanowski.50 Pflaum testified that
Urbanowski told him to deny the existence of the videotape and threatened
him several times before his deposition if he did not. 5 Included in the
threats was at least one in which Urbanowski threatened to kill him.
252
Pflaum introduced "ample evidence of Urbanowski's cruel and violent char-
acter, ' 253 and his knowledge of it.2 54 The court accepted the State's argu-
ment that duress cannot be proven with "[a] threat of future harm," and that
the harm must be imminent and impending.255 It rejected Pflaum's argument
that such a requirement is appropriate in self-defense cases, but not for per-
jury where "it would be absurd to think that anyone could ever have a gun
held to one's head while they testify. 256 The court reasoned that official
proceedings are not always private, and that imminent and impending danger
could be directed to a close family member, so that duress could apply to
some testimonial situations. 25' The court correctly noted that the require-
ment for imminent harm is in accord with case law on the duress defense.258
The Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted the statute criminalizing
the deprivation of an "officer of means of protection or communication" in
Rodriguez v. State.25 9 The Deputy involved in this case responded to a call
of "domestic disturbance between [the defendant] and his father. 2 60 The
defendant continued to yell and scream at his father after the officer's arrival,
and Deputy Keegan decided to handcuff the defendant. 26' Rodriguez
grabbed the handcuffs.2 62 The defendant argued "that [the] handcuffs [were]
not a means of defending oneself as required by the statute ' 263 applying the
248. Id.
249. Id.





255. Pflaum, at 94-95.
256. Id. at 95.
257. Id.
258. Id.




263. Id. at 992.
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"rule of ejusdem generis.,,2' The court declined to apply the rule to limit the
statute to only apply to weapons as "'means' to defend oneself. 2
65
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the common law privi-
lege to prevent escape as it applies to bail bondspersons in Buchanan v.
State.266 Buchanan was a bail bondsman who was attempting to apprehend
Kevin Brinson, a "client[] who had jumped bail., 267 "Brinson attempted to
[escape] a car by climbing over the driver's seat, at which time Buchanan
shot [him] in the buttocks ... ,268 The defendant argued that he was "privi-
lege[d] to 'use whatever [force] necessary to affect ... surrender. ' '269 The
court first acknowledged "that a person 'under bail is in the vicarious cus-
tody of his bondsman,"' who may apprehend him. 270  "Having found no
Florida case law... [supporting an] unfettered privilege [for a bondsperson]
to use deadly force, 271 it refused to find that one existed.272
XII. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion indicates, Florida courts have interpreted a
number of statutes, defenses, and common law doctrines since the last review
article. The decisions seem to uniformly recognize existing criminal doc-
trines and theories-rather than attempt to establish controversial or novel
concepts. The courts also seem to have provided clarification in some areas
of confusion.
264. Rodriguez, 931 So. 2d at 992.
265. Id.




270. Id. (citing Register v. Barton, 75 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1954)).
271. Buchanan, 927 So. 2d at 211.
272. Id. at 212.
[Vol. 32
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/2
